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I. Introduction 
A church is made up of “many members, yet [is] one body.”1 
Unfortunately, the “members” do not always agree on how best to 
direct the “body.”2 Churches have an illustrious history of internal 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law; B.S., 2017, University of South Carolina. Thank you to Professor 
Christopher Seaman for all of his advice throughout the Note-writing process. 
Many thanks to my family who support me in all that I do. 
 1. 1 Corinthians 12:12 (New King James Version). 
 2. See infra Part II (detailing church polity disagreements leading to church 
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disagreements over religious doctrine.3 In recent decades, the 
disputes shifted towards emerging social issues, such as the 
ordination of women and same-sex sex marriage.4 As society shifts 
its opinions on such issues, so do members of church congregations.  
In February 2019, the United Methodist Churchthe second 
largest Protestant church in the United Statesvoted to reject a 
proposal that would allow the ordination and marriage of LGBTQ 
individuals.5 The same debate occurred in the Presbyterian and 
Episcopalian churches and led to countless lawsuits when the 
churches approved inclusive measures concerning the LGBTQ 
population.6 In a national church with millions of members, such 
social polity decisions can fracture a church beyond repair.7  
                                                                                                     
property disputes). 
 3. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 
U.S. 94, 100−04 (1952) (seeing a church split from its “mother” church in Russia 
over political and religious differences); see also HENRY GARLAND & MARY 
GARLAND, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO GERMAN LITERATURE 271 (2005) (describing 
the 95 Theses nailed to Wittenberg Church in 1517 by Martin Luther in protest 
over the church’s indulgences practice); Acts 15:1−21 (New King James Version) 
(providing an account of an early religious dispute between the Pharisees and 
Gentiles). 
 4. See Joe Carter, How to Tell the Difference Between the PCA and PCUSA, 
GOSPEL COALITION (June 23, 2014), 
https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/how-to-tell-the-difference-between-
the-pca-and-pcusa/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (detailing PCA’s objection to 
ordaining women for ministry that led to its separation from PCUSA) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. See Timothy Williams and Elizabeth Dias, United Methodists Tighten 
Ban on Same-Sex Marriage and Gay Clergy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/us/united-methodists-vote.html?smid=fb-
nytimes&smtyp=cur&fbclid=IwAR0i8OvPo7XzJ8WEtfk-
i97D3z4udrurVH5DCpDPFdS1VFG39tPshgS-SzE (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) 
(rejecting a proposal that would see the seven million members of the United 
Methodist Church allowing gay marriage and LGBTQ clergy) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See id. (noting that Presbyterian and Episcopalian churches lost 
conservative members over the approval of same-sex marriage). 
 7. See Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Presbyterian Church (USA) Changes Its 
Constitution to Include Gay Marriage, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/03/17/presbyterian-
church-changes-constitution-to-include-gay-marriage/?utm_term=.bc3a459cdb63 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (stating that the PCUSA has lost 37% of its national 
membership since 1992 over social issue disputes) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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A church divided over social issues often sees an outflux of 
members and the creation of complex property disputes.8 When 
churches are divided, congregations often split along polity lines, 
with one sect remaining loyal to the national church, and one sect 
leaving the denomination.9 Almost immediately, disputes arise 
over ownership of church propertymost commonly the building.10  
Just as important to a congregation, however, is the church’s 
name. As organizations dependent on congregant tithes and 
community reputation, churches often trademark their names and 
symbols to safeguard their goodwill.11 The fight over exclusive use 
to a church’s name is complex and full of uncertainty. This 
complexity is illustrated through a 2017 lawsuit involving a schism 
in the Episcopal Church.12  
The Episcopal Church’s presence in South Carolina dates back 
to 1789.13 The current form of the Lower Diocese of South Carolina 
was incorporated in 1973 with the purpose “to continue an 
Episcopal Diocese under the Constitution and Canons of [t]he 
Episcopal Church.”14 The national Episcopal Church’s move to 
ordain those identifying as LGBTQ caused a nationwide schism,15 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 90 
(S.C. 2017) (detailing a property dispute resulting from a church decision over 
LGBTQ clergy and same-sex marriage). 
 9. See Bailey, supra note 7 (finding the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. split 
over same-sex marriage). 
 10. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 598 (1979) (arguing over exclusive 
ownership of real property that stemmed from a doctrinal disagreement); Watson 
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 721 (1872) (disputing real property ownership after the 
church’s split over slavery). 
 11. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 987 (4th Cir. 1944) (noting the 
goodwill imbedded in a church’s name). 
 12. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 91 (finding the severed 
church seeking exclusive ownership over real and intellectual property). The 
Episcopal Church will be noted as “TEC” in various quotations from court 
opinions throughout this Note. 
 13. See id. at 85 (describing the church’s formation in South Carolina). 
 14.  See id. at 85−86 (“TEC is an unincorporated association comprised of 
subunits known as dioceses. Each diocese is, in turn, comprised of congregations 
known as parishes or missions.”). 
 15. See id. at 90 n.8 (noting the dispute began when the General Convention 
confirmed the first openly homosexual bishop); see also Rev. Canon Dr. Kendall 
S. Harmon, Diocese Releases Statement Regarding Disassociation from the 
Episcopal Church, DIOCESE OF S.C., https://www.dioceseofsc.org/news-
events/legal-news/diocese-releases-statement-regarding-disassociation-
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and resulted in the Lower Diocese of South Carolina breaking 
away from the national Episcopal Church and joining the Anglican 
Church.16 The dissociated Lower Diocese filed suit in 2013 seeking 
a declaration that it was “the true Diocese in the lower part of 
South Carolina, [and] that all property at issue belonged to that 
faction.”17 
Under the United States Supreme Court’s neutral principles 
framework, courts may not undertake judicial review of 
ecclesiastical matters, including disputes resulting from 
differences in doctrine, polity, or governance.18 In the 2017 
Episcopal Church decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
held that the claim at issue concerned ecclesiastical matters of 
church polity and governance, and, thus, under the neutral 
principles approach gave deference to the national Episcopal 
Church.19 The decision meant that the disassociated Diocese lost 
access to real property previously held by the local church for 
generations.20 
In the same decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court held 
that the dissociated Diocese’s state trademarks, which included 
reference to “Episcopal” in the Lower Diocese’s name, were to be 
cancelled in favor of the national Episcopal Church’s federal 
marks.21 The South Carolina Supreme Court made this decision 
without reference to the U.S. Supreme Court’s neutral principles 
                                                                                                     
episcopal-church/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (disapproving of the national 
Episcopal Church’s acceptance of same-sex marriage) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. See Diocese’s Petition for Cert Denied by US Supreme Court, DIOCESE OF 
S.C. (June 11, 2018), https://www.dioceseofsc.org/dioceses-petition-for-cert-
denied-by-us-supreme-court/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (noting the Diocese as a 
member of the Anglican Church in North America) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 17. Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 91. 
 18. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602−03 (describing the advantages of a neutral 
principles approach). 
 19. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 
92−93 (S.C. 2017) (confirming the highest church tribunal’s decision which 
granted real property to the national church). 
 20. See id. at 85 (noting the lengthy history of the congregation in South 
Carolina). 
 21. See id. at 92 (deciding the trademark dispute in favor of the national 
Episcopal Church). 
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approach.22 In the end, the churches were left in uncertain 
territory, as the South Carolina Supreme Court’s order was 
virtually unenforceable without further lower court action.23 The 
South Carolina court removed itself from the real property dispute, 
yet felt it proper to adjudicate the trademark claim.24 Why the 
difference in approach? The difference likely stems from the 
Supreme Court’s lack of jurisprudence on the intersection between 
free exercise and trademarks.25 
The United States was founded in part on the principle of 
freedom of religionfree from religious preferencewhere citizens 
were free to practice any religion.26 The founding fathers felt so 
strongly about this principle that it was incorporated into the First 
Amendment.27 The Free Exercise Clause states that, “Congress 
                                                                                                     
 22. See id. (applying state and federal trademark law without reference to 
common law neutral principles). 
 23. See vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, No. 2:13-587-RMG, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 143513, at *4−5 (D.S.C. Aug. 23, 2018) (continuing the conflict over the 
service marks in the District of South Carolina); see also Andrew Knapp, U.S. 
Supreme Court declines review of Episcopal property dispute from South Carolina, 
POST & COURIER (June 11, 2018), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/us-
supreme-court-declines-review-of-episcopal-property-dispute-
from/article_372580c4-6d7a-11e8-9f32-6ba48799a28f.html (last visited Sept. 23, 
2019) (“The breakaway diocese contended the conflicted nature of the state 
Supreme Court ruling ‘is virtually unenforceable.’”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 24. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 92−93 (holding that court 
involvement in the real property case was improper, while deciding the 
trademark claim). 
 25. The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiorari on such issues. See 
Presbytery of the Twin Cities Area v. Eden Prairie Presbyterian Church, Inc., 
2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 375, review denied, 2017 Minn. LEXIS 444 (July 
18, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2619 (June 11, 2018); Protestant Episcopal 
Church, 806 S.E.2d 82 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018). 
 26. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States of 
America and the Bey and Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary, Tripoli−U.S., Nov. 4, 
1796, art. XI, 8 Stat. 154 (“[T]he government of the United States of America is 
not in any sense founded on the Christian Religionas it has in itself no character 
of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of Musselmen . . . .”); Letter 
from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in THE AMERICAN 
ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT AND A FREE SOCIETY, 
465−66 (Adrienne Koch ed., George Braziller Press 1965) (“Every new & 
successful example therefore of a perfect separation between ecclesiastical and 
civil matters, is of importance . . . religion & Govt. will both exist in greater purity, 
the less they are mixed together.”). 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”28 
The Supreme Court later adopted the neutral principles approach 
to avoid Free Exercise violations resulting from courts deciding 
real property disputes.29 Without the application of the same 
neutral principles to intellectual property disputes between 
churches, however, there is real danger of violating the Free 
Exercise Clause.30 This Note seeks to answer the question: Does 
the government’s role in approving and enforcing trademark rights 
in intra-church disputes violate the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment? 31  
The rest of this Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides an 
overview of Supreme Court church property jurisprudence and 
describes the evolution of the neutral principles approach. This 
Note primarily focuses on property disputes between hierarchical 
churches, as their governing structure leaves them most 
vulnerable to Free Exercise implications. Part III outlines how an 
entity, secular or religious, registers a trademark with the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The section details 
infringement actions and provides examples of registered church 
trademarks. Part IV concerns the constitutional implications of 
church trademark adjudication, specifically through the lens of the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Part IV.A 
concludes that the USPTO’s registering of church trademarks does 
not violate the Establishment Clause. Part IV.B analyzes Free 
Exercise implications concerning the adjudication of trademark 
infringement suits. Because of the neutral principles approach and 
the inherently ecclesiastical nature of church trademarks, Part 
IV.B concludes that current court action violates the Free Exercise 
Clause. Part V suggests that courts should uniformly apply the 
neutral principles approach to real and intellectual property 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id.  
 29. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969) (stating that courts have no role 
in determining ecclesiastical questions when dealing with property disputes). 
 30. See Brief of the Falls Church Anglican and the American Anglican 
Council as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Protestant Episcopal 
Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82 (S.C. 2017) (No. 17-1136) (noting the 
conflict and uncertainty resulting from competing interpretations of the neutral 
principles approach). 
 31. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
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disputes alike. This section theorizes that such an approach would 
prevent future Free Exercise violations. 
II. Supreme Court Church Property Jurisprudence 
Religious schisms giving rise to property disputes are nothing 
new.32 Most commonly, the disputes are caused by all, or part, of a 
local congregation disagreeing with the doctrinal changes of the 
national church, causing the local church to split from its 
denomination.33 These cases typically involve a division of 
members into distinct factions, usually two, with each claiming the 
exclusive use of the property held and owned by that local church.34 
Religious congregations often have strong attachments to church 
property, most commonly the church building.35 One such case saw 
leaders in the Lower Diocese of South Carolina seeking to leave 
The Episcopal Church over a doctrinal disagreement, while 
preserving the right to church property, including the 
congregation’s place of worship.36 
The intermingling of property and religious issues led the 
Supreme Court to first intercede in church property disputes 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Episcopal Church v. Salazar, 547 S.W.3d 353, 360−61 (Tex. App. 
2018) (noting that the Episcopal Church was founded in 1789 after it broke from 
the Church of England). 
 33. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 981−83 (4th Cir. 1944) (seeing 
those opposed to a church merger leave the church and seek to retain use of the 
church property and name); Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of 
Christ v. Evans, 520 A.2d 1347, 1349−51 (N.J. 1987) (adjudicating use of the name 
“Christian Science” between a break-off faction and the original church); 
Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 84−86 (S.C. 
2017) (finding the majority of a local church leaving the national Episcopal 
Church). 
 34. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 720−21 (1872) (stating that slavery 
was the source of conflict between the two religious factions). 
 35. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting cases where the church 
property suit centered on control of the church building); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas 
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 95−96 (1952) (finding the 
church wanting to occupy its building in New York after leaving the international 
church). 
 36. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 91 
(“Respondents . . . [seek] a declaration that respondent Disassociated Diocese was 
the true Diocese in the lower part of South Carolina, that all property at issue 
belonged to that faction.”). 
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almost 150 years ago.37 The Court expressed the importance of 
strict adherence to the Free Exercise Clause, saying, “Ours is a 
government which by the ‘law of its being’ allows no statute, state 
or national, that prohibits the free exercise of religion. There are 
occasions when civil courts must draw lines between the 
responsibilities of church and state for the disposition or use of 
property.”38 The Court recognized that history is full of examples 
showcasing governmental involvement in religious disputes, 
stressing the danger that comes with adjudicating religious 
conflicts.39 
Before adjudicating a church property claim, courts must first 
determine the religious organization’s structure.40 Churches can 
have one of two organizational structures: hierarchical41 or 
congregational.42 Hierarchical organization of a religious 
institution complicates intra-church property disputes because of 
the presence of a high church tribunal.43 When religious disputes 
                                                                                                     
 37. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 729 (“It is of the essence of these religious unions, 
and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among 
themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical 
cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.”). 
 38. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120 (1952) (concerning the right to use and 
occupy a church building in New York City). 
 39. See id. at 124−25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The long, unedifying 
history of the contest between the secular state and the church is replete with 
instances of attempts by civil government to exert pressure upon religious 
authority.”); see also John E. Fennelly, Property Disputes and Religious Schisms: 
Who is the Church?, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 319, 324−25 (1997) (discussing Justice 
Frankfurter’s recognition of the dangers of court involvement in religious 
disputes). 
 40. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597 (1979) (finding that hierarchical 
church structures, like the church at issue, mandates deferral to the authoritative 
tribunal of the church). 
 41. See id. at 599 (noting that the local church property is held in trust for 
the general church and was, therefore, hierarchical). 
 42. See First Indep. Missionary Baptist Church v. McMillan, 153 So. 2d 337, 
340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (“Where a church is . . . strictly 
congregational . . . its rights to the use of the property must be determined by the 
ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations.”). 
 43. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708−09 
(1976) (noting that where analysis involves “religious law and polity, 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not 
disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of 
hierarchical polity”). The “Holy Assembly of Bishops and the Holy Synod of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church (Mother Church)” is the highest ecclesiastical tribunal. 
Id. at 697. The tribunal makes religious polity decisions for all churches under 
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are subject to final judgment under a church tribunal, the ruling 
stands for all lower churches within the denomination.44 However, 
if the church is congregational, the dispute is easily solved, as the 
local church retains greater autonomy and holds the property 
independently.45 
Crucial to adjudicating such disputes is the principle that the 
court cannot involve itself in any “consideration of doctrinal 
matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of 
faith.”46 Courts employ a two-step framework for adjudicating real 
property disputes.47 Over time, this framework has evolved into 
the modern neutral principles approach.48 
First, the court must decide if the dispute requires the trier of 
fact to look into doctrinal issues, such as church governance or 
ideology of the adverse factions, as opposed to basic property 
issues, such as examining the title owner.49 Doctrinal matters 
often stem from the national church attempting to respond to 
societal changes and political movements, which the local church 
resists.50 There must be “no inquiry into the existing religious 
                                                                                                     
the Mother Church. Id. at 708. 
 44. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969) (noting the right for churches to 
establish their own high tribunals). 
 45. See First Indep. Missionary Baptist Church, 153 So. 2d at 340 (describing 
the application of ordinary law to solve congregational real property disputes). 
Because of this more straightforward application, congregational churches are 
not the focus of this Note. Unless otherwise noted, the religious organizations in 
this Note are hierarchical. 
 46. Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God, Inc., 396 U.S. 
367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 47. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 605−08 (declaring that courts may either (1) defer 
to high church tribunals, or (2) apply neutral principles). 
 48. See id. at 599−604 (warning that neutral principles is not appropriate if 
the analysis “would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy”). 
 49. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 
449 (noting the danger of adjudicating a church property dispute involving 
doctrinal issues). 
 50. See id. at 442 n.1 (detailing the controversy that erupted when the 
Presbyterian Church endorsed women’s ordination, opposed the Vietnam War, 
and supported the removal of prayer from public schools); Watson v. Jones, 80 
U.S. 679, 690−91 (1979) (describing the church dispute over slavery); Kedroff v. 
St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 100−06 (1952) 
(detailing the Cold War-era split between a New York Russian Orthodox church 
and the Russian mother church).  
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opinions . . . for, if such was permitted, a very small 
minority, . . . might be found to be the only faithful supporters of 
the religious dogmas of the founders of the church.”51 Where the 
case requires doctrinal involvement, the court must yield and defer 
to the highest church authority.52 Deference absolves the court of 
involvement in the matter.53  
Second, assuming doctrinal issues are not at play and 
deference is not required, the court must apply neutral principles 
of law to adjudicate the real property dispute.54 The neutral 
principles approach “is completely secular in operation, and yet 
flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization 
and polity.”55 The approach is constitutional because it applies the 
law objectively, and absolves courts from involvement in religious 
polity disputes.56 Neutral principles also involves examining 
property deeds, relevant state statutes dealing with implied trusts, 
and church legal documents or contracts signed between the local 
and general church to determine property ownership.57 
Put simply, neutral principles first requires the court to 
determine if there is a doctrinal issue at play in the suit.58 If 
doctrinal issues are present, then the highest court tribunal 
resolves the claim.59 If the claim is free from doctrinal 
entanglement, the court is free to adjudicate the issue using 
                                                                                                     
 51. Watson, 80 U.S. at 725. 
 52. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (stating that courts are 
required to defer to ecclesiastical bodies when questions of religious doctrine or 
polity are involved). 
 53. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 724−25 (noting that when 
deference is exercised “the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their 
decisions as binding upon them”). 
 54.  See Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 
1244, 1249−50 (9th Cir. 1999) (listing the advantages of the neutral principles 
approach). 
 55. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603. 
 56. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 332 (commenting on the Court’s 
reasoning in Wolf for adopting neutral principles). 
 57. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 600, 602−03 (noting that the neutral principles 
approach is “consistent with the Constitution”).  
 58. See id. at 607 (stating that the question of which church faction 
represents the “true congregation” cannot be answered by the court). 
 59. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 727 (recognizing the church tribunal’s ultimate 
authority concerning ecclesiastical matters). 
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 60. See Presbyterian Church in U.S v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“Civil courts do not inhibit free 
exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church 
property.”). 
 61. See Episcopal Church v. Salazar, 547 S.W.3d 353, 409 (Tex. App. 2018) 
(depicting the analytical process used by courts in adjudicating real property 
disputes with a neutral principles approach). 
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The Supreme Court applied neutral principles in Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church.62 The dispute 
centered around the right to use and occupy the St. Nicholas 
Cathedral in New York City, which was religiously affiliated with 
the Russian Orthodox Church.63 The archbishop of the American 
churches, chosen by an American ecclesiastical committee, sought 
a corporate right to exclusively occupy the cathedral.64 The then 
possessors of the Cathedral, led by the archbishop appointed by the 
Patriarch in Moscow, Russia, opposed this act.65 Determination of 
the right to use and occupy the cathedral depended on which 
archbishop appointment, the American or Russian, was valid.66 
Applying neutral principles, the Court first determined that 
the issue of church leadership was an ecclesiastical one.67 Because 
the ecclesiastical head in Moscow retained power over the 
American churches, its appointment of the archbishop was 
considered valid.68 While the dispute stemmed from the right to 
control real property, the Court recognized the underlying issue of 
church governance and properly applied neutral principles, which 
mandated deferral to the highest church tribunal.69 
Yet, even though the Supreme Court adopted neutral 
principles,70 state courts do not apply it uniformly.71 This may 
                                                                                                     
 62. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 63. See id. at 95−97 (emphasizing the long connection between the local N.Y. 
congregation and its Russian counterparts). 
 64. See id. at 96 (stating that Archbishop Leonty, the head of all North 
American and Canadian churches, was appointed by an American ecclesiastical 
body). 
 65. See id. (discussing Archbishop Fedchenkoff’s appointment by the 
ecclesiastical leaders in Moscow). 
 66. See id. at 96−97 (recognizing the potential constitutional issues in 
examining church governance issues). 
 67. See id. at 115 (noting that “the power of the Supreme Church Authority 
of the Russian Orthodox Church to appoint the ruling hierarch of the archdiocese 
of North America” was ecclesiastical). 
 68. See id. at 120 (finding no relinquishment of “power by the Russian 
Orthodox Church”). 
 69. See id. at 120−21 (“Even in those cases when the property right follows 
as an incident from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, 
the church rule controls.”). 
 70. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (adopting the neutral 
principles approach for its flexible, non-intrusive manner). 
 71. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 335−53 (noting four states’ rejections of 
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stem from the Court’s own inner turmoil over the approach.72 The 
addition of intra-church trademark disputes further complicates 
neutral principles. Because the Supreme Court has yet to speak on 
this specific issue,73 lower courts left to their own devices produce 
inconsistent results.74 
Even with the uncertainties surrounding church property 
adjudication, the Supreme Court envisioned a process as free from 
governmental involvement as possible.75 
III. Trademarks Within the Religious Context 
Trademarks and their precursors have been protected at 
common law and in equity since the founding of the United 
States.76 Underlying trademark law is the principle that 
distinctive marks should be afforded protection to distinguish a 
particular good or service from others.77 Courts recognize that, like 
secular entities, religious organizations should be protected by the 
“the common law principles of unfair competition.”78 In the 
                                                                                                     
the neutral principles approach and eight states’ application of it). 
 72. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 610−14 (warning that neutral principles may 
increase government involvement in church disputes); see also Fennelly, supra 
note 39, at 332 (discussing the four Justice dissent in Wolf that questioned the 
practicality of the neutral principles approach). 
 73. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82 
(S.C. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-1136, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3624 (U.S. June 11, 2018) 
(denying certiorari on a church property dispute involving intra-church 
trademark components). 
 74. See infra note 191 (detailing cases in which courts reach varying results). 
 75. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“[T]he First Amendment severely 
circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property 
disputes.”). 
 76. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (summarizing the history 
of American trademark law (citing 3 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 19:8 (4th ed. 2017))). 
 77. See id. at 1751−52 (discussing how trademarks help consumers make 
purchasing decisions). 
 78. Okla. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of Okla. v. New Hope 
Assembly of God Church of Norman, 597 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Okla. 1979); see also 
Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 987−88 (4th Cir. 1944) (protecting the merged 
majority faction from infringement by the minority). 
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religious context, churches use trademarks to promote their 
unique identities amongst a sea of similar organizations.79 
Along with the protection afforded by a registered trademark, 
the marks serve as source identifiers to the public.80 In Matal v. 
Tam,81 the Supreme Court evaluated a band name’s proposed 
trademark and noted that the trademark would not only identify 
the band but would also serve to express a view about social 
issues.82 The power of trademarks to convey such messages makes 
them especially important to religious entities.83 
The Lanham Act establishes the regulatory framework for all 
entities seeking trademark protection for goods and services.84 
Religious and secular organizations are equally eligible to register 
and receive protection for their trademarks,85 so long as their mark 
satisfies the necessary elements.86 As of November 2018, the 
USPTO lists more than 1,000 trademarks including the word 
“church.”87 
                                                                                                     
 79. See Purcell, 145 F.2d at 985 (“[W]hile [churches] exist for the worship of 
Almighty God . . . they are nevertheless dependent upon the contributions of their 
members for means to carry on their work.”). 
 80. See Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. 
Robinson, 115 F. Supp. 2d 607, 610 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (noting that the trademark 
“Seventh-Day Adventist” identified “the Mother Church as the source of products 
and services”). 
 81. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 82.  See id. at 1764 (granting the trademark under provisions of the Lanham 
Act). 
 83.  See Purcell, 145 F.2d at 983 (“The name of this church, . . . was of great 
value, not only because business was carried on and property held in that name, 
but also because millions of members associated with the name the most sacred 
of their personal relationships and the holiest of their family traditions.”). 
 84. See Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (outlining the 
components necessary for federal trademark protection).  
 85. See Purcell, 145 F.2d at 985 (noting that non-secular organizations are 
eligible for trademark protection); Nat’l Bd. of YWCA v. YWCA, 335 F. Supp. 615, 
621 (D.S.C. 1971) (stating that “a religious . . . organization is entitled to protect 
the use of its name against those who secede”). 
 86. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (detailing application requirements for registration 
of trademarks with the Patent and Trademark Office); see also Trademark 
Manual of Examining Procedure, U.S.P.T.O. (Oct. 2018), 
https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) 
(“[O]utlines the procedures which Examining Attorneys are required or 
authorized to follow in the examination of trademark applications.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 87. See Paul Tarr, What the 2nd Circ. Missed in Religious Trademark Case, 
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The Lanham Act first requires that the mark be used in 
commerce.88 Trademarks used by members of a collective 
organization, known as collective marks, satisfy the “for use in 
commerce” requirement.89 Collective marks, such as a church’s 
name or symbol,90 are used to indicate membership.91 Collective 
marks are also trademarkable, subject to Section 1052 of the 
Lanham Act, which states that marks must be distinctive so as not 
to cause confusion, mistake or deception.92 Church trademark 
infringement actions are most frequently brought under this 
provision of the Act.93 
Religious marks often come under scrutiny when faced with 
the distinctiveness requirement of § 1052 because their marks are 
often labeled as generic.94 Church trademarks are deemed generic 
if they merely state the denomination, such as “Assembly of God.”95 
                                                                                                     
Law 360 (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1101356/what-the-
2nd-circ-missed-in-religious-trademark-case (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) 
(detailing the advantages of churches obtaining trademarks, including the ability 
to protect their “spiritual message”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 88.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “use in commerce” as a bona fide use of 
the mark in the ordinary course of trade). 
 89. See id. §§ 1127, 1154 (stating that collective marks are registrable under 
the same requirements as trademarks). 
 90.  See, e.g., Nat’l Bd. of YWCA, 35 F. Supp. at 619 (noting plaintiff’s five 
registered marks, indicating membership in the Young Women’s Christian 
Association). 
 91. See MICHAEL J. SCHWAB, ACQUIRING TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND 
REGISTRATIONS (West 2019) (defining collective marks as used to distinguish 
goods and services of members from those of non-members). 
 92. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (detailing requirements for trademark 
protection). 
 93. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 
404−05 (6th Cir. 2010) (deciding a trademark infringement suit based on McGill's 
use of protected marks in advertising of his breakaway church); Nat’l Bd. of 
YWCA, 35 F. Supp. at 629 (upholding an infringement claim for the use of the 
trademark “Young Women's Christian Association”).   
 94. See Okla. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of Okla. v. New Hope 
Assembly of God Church of Norman, 597 P.2d 1211, 1213−15 (Okla. 1979) 
(attacking the validity of trademark for “Assembly of God” on grounds it is 
generic); see also Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 988 (4th Cir. 1944) (noting 
that while the word “Methodist” is generic, the church’s name in whole was not). 
 95. See Okla. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of Okla., 597 P.2d at 
1213 (“‘Assembly of God’”. . . is a generic or descriptive term having no specific 
relationship to any body or group but having a wide and broad application to those 
people who assemble to do God's work as they see it.”). 
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A generic name is not entitled to legal protection because it is 
merely “descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities, 
ingredients, or characteristics.”96 The Southern District of New 
York described the difference between a generic mark and a valid 
distinctive one, stating, “[A] generic mark is one that answers the 
question ‘What are you?’ while a valid trademark answers ‘Who 
are you?’”97 
Because generic names are so commonly used, giving only one 
entity the exclusive rights to a generic term creates a monopoly.98  
In Oklahoma Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of Oklahoma 
v. New Hope Assembly of God Church of Norman,99 the court 
decided that the term “Assembly of God” was generic and lacked 
secondary meaning outside of identifying the church 
denomination, precluding it from trademark protection.100 
Analyzing the church name for potential trademark protection is 
complex, and often leaves courts divided over whether similar 
marks are generic.101 
Once a religious entity satisfies all trademark elements, the 
mark is entitled to trademark registration with the USPTO.102 
                                                                                                     
 96. Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 54 (1880). See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) 
(disallowing trademark protection for marks that are merely descriptive); 
Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Evans, 105 N.J. 297, 
309 (1987) (noting that a secondary meaning, “no matter how strong, can never 
earn trademark status for a generic word or phrase”). 
 97. See Universal Church, Inc. v. Universal Life Church/ULC Monastery, 
No. 14Civ.5213(NRB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127362, at *12, *15−18 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 8, 2017) (deciding that the term “Universal Church” was generic); Universal 
Church, Inc. v. Toellner, No. 17-2960-cv, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31153, at *2−4 
(2d Cir. Nov. 2, 2018) (same). 
 98. See Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Evans, 105 
N.J. 297, 306−07 (1987) (deciding that “Christian Science” was generic, and that 
granting the Church exclusive use to the term would preclude others from rightful 
use). 
 99. 597 P.2d 1211 (Okla. 1979). 
 100. See id. at 1214−15 (denying trademark protection for “Assembly of God” 
because it was deemed generic). 
 101. Compare Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, 
Scientist v. Robinson, 115 F. Supp. 2d 607, 610−11 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (deciding that 
the church name “Christian Science” was not generic), with Christian Sci. Bd. of 
Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Evans, 105 N.J. 297, 307−08 (1987) (deciding 
that the church name “Christian Science” was generic). 
 102. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (“A person who has a bona fide intention, 
under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to use a trademark 
in commerce may request registration of its trademark . . . .”); see also id. § 1127 
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While registration is not mandatory to obtain legal protection,103 it 
is highly recommended since it serves as constructive notice of the 
“registrant’s claim of ownership” of the mark.104 USPTO agents 
review each trademark application individually without an inquiry 
into the viewpoint of the mark.105  
The USPTO has made it clear, however, that registration of a 
mark does not indicate the government’s approval of the mark,106 
and the Supreme Court has indicated that trademarks are not a 
form of government speech.107 Government neutrality in 
registering trademarks is key to Establishment Clause 
compliance.108 
Registration of a trademark is especially useful in cases of 
trademark infringement109 because it serves as prima facie 
evidence of one’s exclusive legal right to the mark.110 In church 
disputes, long-standing registration is used to preclude 
break-away factions from gaining access to the marks.111 The 
                                                                                                     
(defining person as including “the United States, any agency or instrumentality 
thereof, or any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and 
with the authorization and consent of the United States”). 
 103. See id. § 1125(c)(6) (providing remedies for trademark infringement 
without prior trademark registration). 
 104. See id. § 1072 (“Registration of a mark on the principal register . . . shall 
be constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof.”); see also 
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752−53 (2017) (noting the advantages of 
registering a trademark with the USPTO). 
 105. See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758 (“[I]f the mark meets the Lanham Act’s 
viewpoint−neutral requirements, registration is mandatory.”). 
 106. See id. at 1759 (finding the Court clarifying that “issuance of a trademark 
registration . . . is not a government imprimatur” (citing In re Old Glory Condom 
Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1220 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 1993))). 
 107. See id. at 1758 (“If the federal registration of a trademark makes the 
mark government speech . . . [i]t is saying many unseemly things. . . . It is 
expressing contradictory views. It is unashamedly endorsing a vast array of 
commercial products and services.”). 
 108. See infra notes 125–130 and accompanying text (discussing the neutral 
registration of trademarks, which avoids Establishment Clause implications). 
 109. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1301 (2015) 
(“The owner of a mark, whether registered or not, can bring suit in federal court 
if another is using a mark that too closely resembles the plaintiff’s.”). 
 110. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(6) (“The ownership by a person of a valid 
registration under . . . the principal register under this Act shall be a complete 
bar to an action against that person.”). 
 111. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 
405 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting the church has registered marks “Seventh-day 
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registration of trademarks is fairly straightforward thanks to the 
clear procedures set out in the Lanham Act.112 However, since a 
church’s association with its names and marks often pre-dates the 
Lanham Act by many years, early common law trademarks often 
do not fit neatly into the Act’s framework.113 
IV. Constitutional Implications of Church Trademark 
Adjudication 
When an entity alleges trademark infringement, courts apply 
the Lanham Act to determine if the legal rights to a mark have 
been violated, and if so, to determine the appropriate remedy for 
the violation.114 The matter is complicated when non-secular 
entities are on both sides of a trademark infringement suit.115 
Because of the long history of separation of church and state in the 
United States, courts are wary to wade into religious matters.116  
The First Amendment provides religious freedoms and 
protections, stating that “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
                                                                                                     
Adventist,” “Adventist,” and “General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists”); 
Nat’l Bd. of YWCA v. YWCA, 335 F. Supp. 615, 619−20 (D.S.C. 1971) (detailing 
the YWCA’s five registered trademarks, including “Young Women’s Christian 
Association”); Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 
92 (S.C. 2017) (noting the federally registered trademarks held by the national 
church“The Episcopal Church” and “The Protestant Episcopal Church in the 
United States of America”which took precedence over state trademarks 
obtained by the local church). 
 112. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (describing the procedures for the registration of 
trademarks). 
 113. See Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (noting 
religious organizations are entitled to trade name protection in a decision decided 
before the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946). 
 114. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (noting remedies and infringement 
procedures). 
 115. See infra notes 191, 197, 198 and accompanying text (describing the 
challenges of church trademark adjudication). 
 116. See Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S. Under the 
Hereditary Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the 
U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d 837, 846 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When a district judge takes sides in 
a religious schism, purports to decide matters of spiritual succession, and 
excludes dissenters from using the name, symbols, and marks of the faith . . . the 
First Amendment line appears to have been crossed.”). 
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thereof . . . .”117 The Establishment Clause prevents the state from 
supporting or declaring a religion,118 while the Free Exercise 
Clause119 gives citizens the “right to believe and profess whatever 
religious doctrine one desires” without state interference.120 
A. The Establishment Clause 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is far from clear,121 but 
there is a general consensus among courts that the Clause is not 
violated when churches are granted trademarks.122 The U.S. 
District Court of South Carolina summarized the issue well, saying 
[T]his Court does not believe that the First 
Amendment prohibits the United States Patent Office 
from granting a trademark to the plaintiff or to any other 
religious organization . . . . Such registration by the 
                                                                                                     
 117. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 118. Id.; see also Jed Silversmith & Jack Guggenheim, Between Heaven and 
Earth: The Interrelationship Between Intellectual Property and the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 467, 470 (2001) (describing the 
role of the Establishment Clause in religious jurisprudence). 
 119. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 120. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
 121. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (describing a 
three-prong test for determining if state action violates the First Amendment); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825−26 (1995) 
(proscribing that a statute is valid under the Establishment Clause if it is applied 
in an impartial manner). Courts inconsistently apply Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Clause is “unsatisfying.” 
See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, ET. AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 276−79 
(2002) (noting the inconsistencies amongst courts in the Establishment Clause 
arena). 
 122. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 
405−08 (6th Cir. 2010) (confirming the validity of the church’s federal trademark), 
Nat’l Bd. of the YWCA v. YWCA, 335 F. Supp. 615, 624−25 (D.S.C. 1971) 
(“Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a religious organization from owning 
propertyand a trademark is a property rightor prohibits the government from 
protecting that property from unlawful appropriation by others.”); Protestant 
Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 92 (S.C. 2017) (stating the 
validity of the national church’s federal trademarks); Lutheran Free Church v. 
Lutheran Free Church, 141 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Minn. 1966) (affirming a majority 
faction’s ownership of the church’s trademark). 
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Patent Office is . . . analogous to a state granting a charter 
to a church or to a religious institution.123 
It is well-established that exclusive rights to trademark names 
may be given to businesses, including “charitable, religious and 
other societies.”124 Trademarks are granted to churches, just like 
corporations and secular entities, to protect against the use of one’s 
identity or a similar name that would cause confusion for the 
general public.125  
 The USPTO grants trademarks without any regard to a 
religious organization’s doctrine.126 Trademarks are issued based 
on a set of definitive criteria that are evaluated in the same 
manner for secular and religious entities.127 USPTO examiners, 
barring circumstances not at issue in this Note,128 are not 
permitted to inquire “whether any viewpoint conveyed by a mark 
                                                                                                     
 123. Nat’l Bd. of the YWCA, 335 F. Supp. at 624−25. 
 124. Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921); see also 
Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 985 (4th Cir. 1944) (“[A] benevolent, fraternal, 
or social organization will be protected in the use of its name by injunction . . . .” 
(citing NIMS ON UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS (3d ed.) § 86; THOMPSON 
ON CORPORATIONS (3d ed.) §  77)). 
 125. See Purcell, 145 F.2d at 987 (“Men have the right to worship God 
according to the dictates of conscience; but they have no right in doing so to make 
use of a name which will enable them to appropriate the good will which has been 
built up by an organization . . . .”); see also Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Right 
of Charitable or Religious Association or Corporation to Protection Against Use of 
Same or Similar Name by Another, 37 A.L.R.3d 277 (2018) (noting that churches 
should be protected from unfair competition, but that “courts in a few of the cases 
herein have suggested that such rules ought not to be applied with the same 
strictness”). 
 126. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017) (noting that the Lanham 
Act does not generally allow for inquiry into a trademark’s viewpoint, and that 
registration is mandatory if all necessary elements are complied with); 1 GILSON 
ON TRADEMARKS § 3.04 (2018) (describing the application and approval process for 
obtaining a trademark through the USPTO). 
 127. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (listing criteria for registration of 
trademarks, such as exclusivity and use in commerce). 
 128. The only instance where USPTO examiners are permitted to inquire into 
the viewpoint of the trademark is where Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is 
implicated. See id. § 1052(a) (“Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or 
scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage . . . institutions, beliefs, or 
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”). Matal involved a 
dispute of this sort. 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (holding the disparagement clause of the 
Lanham Act unconstitutional). See also In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1341 (9th 
Cir. 2017), cert. granted, Iancu v. Brunetti, 202 L. Ed. 2d 510 (2019) (questioning 
the constitutionality of the “immoral or scandalous” clause of the Lanham Act). 
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is consistent with Government policy or whether any such 
viewpoint is consistent with that expressed by other marks already 
on the principal register.”129 Additionally, federal registration of 
trademarks does not constitute approval of the mark’s content or 
message on the government’s behalf.130 A trademark simply 
indicates exclusive legal ownership in the eyes of the 
government.131 
 Because courts apply trademark law to religious organizations 
the same as they do to all other entities, state action granting 
churches trademarks does not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause.132 Trademark laws are secular in purpose.133 Just as 
churches use corporate law to formalize their entity’s existence,134 
churches use trademark law to protect their goodwill and 
reputation as would any entity with valuable intellectual 
property.135 There is general agreement that the granting of 
trademarks to churches does not violate the Establishment 
Clause.136 
                                                                                                     
 129. See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757−58 (“[T]he First Amendment forbids the 
government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the 
expense of others.”). 
 130. See id. at 1758 (stating that trademark registration is not equivalent to 
government speech or approval of the trademark registered). 
 131. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (“[T]he filing of the application to register such 
mark shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, 
nationwide in effect . . . .”). 
 132. See Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 471−72 (stating that 
statutes survive Establishment Clause scrutiny if they are neutral and are 
applied even-handedly and broadly). 
 133. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612−13 (1971) (describing the 
three-prong test as (1) statute must have a secular legislative purpose, (2) 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion, and (3) must not foster an excessive government entanglement with 
religion). 
 134. See Sovereign Order of Saint John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1238 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (noting the church as a Delaware corporation); Rosicrucian Fellowship 
v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church, 245 P.2d 481, 489 (Cal. 1952) 
(noting the corporate status of the religious organization). 
 135. See David A. Simon, Register Trademarks and Keep the Faith: 
Trademarks, Religion and Identity, 49 IDEA 233, 239 (2009) (“[R]eligious 
organizations use trademark law to protect 
their identities . . . because trademarks are cultural forms that assume local 
meanings . . . for those who incorporate them into their daily lives.”). 
 136. The remainder of the Note focuses on the implications of church 
trademarks on the Free Exercise Clause. For additional scholarship on 
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 However, state action deemed valid under the Establishment 
Clause may be considered invalid under the Free Exercise 
Clause.137 The Supreme Court described the clash between the two 
religious clauses of the First Amendment, saying, “These two 
Clauses . . . are frequently in tension . . . . Yet we have long said 
that ‘there is room for play in the joints’ between them. In other 
words, there are some state actions permitted by the 
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise 
Clause.”138 While it is settled that the granting of trademarks does 
not abridge the Establishment Clause,139 Free Exercise 
implications remain. 
B. The Free Exercise Clause 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment140 prevents 
government regulation of religious beliefs and guarantees the 
freedom to believe whatever religious doctrine one chooses,141 as 
“[t]he freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute.”142 
However, one may not claim “free exercise” to excuse disobeying a 
                                                                                                     
Establishment Clause issues in the church trademark context, see Silversmith & 
Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 468 (examining the clash between intellectual 
property rights and the religious clauses of the First Amendment); N. Cameron 
Russell, Allocation of New Top-Level Domain Names and the Effect Upon 
Religious Freedom, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 697, 700 (2013) 
(suggesting that there should be a strong presumption against religious 
trademark protection to avoid constitutional violations). 
 137.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (recognizing that the 
religious clauses of the First Amendment are distinct). 
 138. Id. at 718−19 (internal citations omitted (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of 
City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))). 
 139. See supra notes 132−136 and accompanying text (stating that 
religious-focused trademarks may survive Establishment Clause scrutiny). 
 140. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 141. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The free 
exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess 
whatever religious doctrine one desires.”); Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is 
Dead, Long Lived Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability 
Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 856 (2001) (“The government may 
not . . . lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious 
authority or dogma.”). 
 142. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (Warren, C.J.) 
(“Compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of 
worship is strictly forbidden.”). 
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neutral law.143 In reality, there are limits on the “freedom” of free 
exercise.144 While the freedom to religious beliefs is absolute, the 
freedom to act on those beliefs is not.145  
A law is unconstitutional only if it is aimed at promoting or 
restricting religious beliefs.146 In Employment Division v. Smith,147 
employees were denied unemployment benefits due to their 
religious use of the drug peyote.148 While the religious use of the 
drug may have been legitimate, the justification behind the Oregon 
law, which criminalized the use of peyote, outweighed any Free 
Exercise concerns.149 Although discriminatory in effect, the Oregon 
law was neutral in its purpose and thus did not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause.150 
Much like Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the body of 
cases involving the Free Exercise Clause is muddled.151 Legislation 
                                                                                                     
 143. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (“[The] Court 
has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental 
regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for 
‘even when the action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, [it] is not totally 
free from legislative restrictions.’” (quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603)). 
 144. See Duncan, supra note 141, at 850−51 (noting Court interpretation of 
the Free Exercise Clause as giving the government “a license . . . to ‘proscribe 
conduct that . . . religion proscribes’”). 
 145.  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (“The freedom to 
act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that 
protection. . . . [T]he power to regulate must be so exercised as not . . . unduly to 
infringe the protected freedom.”). 
 146. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878−82 (stating that neutral and generally 
applicable laws will only rarely violate the Free Exercise Clause).  
 147. 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
 148. See id. at 875 (noting that the religious use of peyote was outlawed under 
the Oregon law). 
 149. See id. at 878−80 (giving various examples of cases where neutral laws 
that infringed upon religious practices were upheld). 
 150. See id. at 890 (noting that state legislatures are free to make religious 
exceptions to their own laws that would prevent outcomes similar to the case in 
question). 
 151. Congress responded to Smith and enacted the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, which states that, “Government shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability.” 42 U.S.C. §  2000bb−1 (2012). The Act is no longer applicable to 
states. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (invalidating the Act 
as applied to state action); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859−61 (2015) (indicating 
that the Act was still in force regarding federal action). The Sixth Circuit 
indicated the inapplicability of the Act to intra-church trademark disputes since 
the Act “does not apply in suits between private parties.” Gen. Conf. Corp. of 
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or state action must be neutral and generally applicable to avoid 
triggering Free Exercise scrutiny.152 If a law appears to target 
religious practices or doctrine, the challenged state action must 
pass the “compelling interest” test, which requires the state to 
prove that the action does not burden free exercise rights, or to 
prove that any incidental burden imposed is justified by a 
compelling state interest.153  
On its face the Lanham Act, which governs the federal 
issuance and enforcement of trademarks,154 is not aimed at 
promoting or restricting religious beliefsit is neutral.155 The 
issuance of church trademarks does not infringe on the religious 
freedoms guaranteed in the First Amendment.156 Free Exercise 
issues do arise, however, once churches find themselves in disputes 
with one another because these disputes force courts to intervene 
in ecclesiastical conflicts.157  
While it is true that courts have an “obvious and legitimate 
interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes,”158 the 
interest must be balanced with the courts’ duty to refrain from 
involvement in doctrinal disputes in conflict with the Free Exercise 
Clause.159 Since the courts’ initial involvement in church property 
                                                                                                     
Seventh Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 410 (6th Cir. 2010). For 
additional scholarship on the Free Exercise Clause, see Duncan, supra note 141, 
at 850 (arguing that Free Exercise is “alive and well in the wake of Smith”). 
 152. See Duncan, supra note at 141, 865−67 (“The neutrality requirement is 
designed to forbid direct religious persecution, however, the ‘precise evil’ 
prohibited by the general applicability requirement is the inequality that results 
when underinclusive legal prohibitions are enforced against religious conduct.”). 
 153. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (stating that a compelling state interest 
must be “within the State’s constitutional power to regulate”). 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). 
 155. See supra notes 105−107 and accompanying text (discussing the neutral 
application of federal trademark laws). 
 156. See supra notes 128–135 and accompanying text (noting that religious 
freedoms are not violated when churches are granted federal trademarks). 
 157. See infra note 245 and accompanying text (describing cases where church 
trademark disputes implicated the Free Exercise Clause). 
 158. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (stating that there is value in 
the courts providing a civil forum for church property adjudication). 
 159. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 
U.S. 94, 120−21 (1952) (“[I]n those cases when the property right follows as an 
incident from decisions of . . . ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls . . . in 
order that there may be free exercise of religion.”); Rosicrucian Fellowship v. 
Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church, 245 P.2d 481, 487 (Cal. 1952) 
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disputes, “it was said that American law knew ‘no heresy and is 
committed to the support of no dogma.’”160 
Courts must avoid interference with church doctrinal topics, 
but should afford churches all protections allowed by civil law.161 
Before involvement in the case, courts must determine whether the 
dispute will require them “to decide issues of religious law, 
principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or administrationin other 
words, is the corporate dispute actually ecclesiastical in nature.”162 
The Supreme Court has cautioned against heavy court 
involvement in church doctrinal disputes, noting that justice would 
likely not be promoted by judiciary review.163 Justice Frankfurter 
summarized many instances in history in which government 
action threatened the independence of religious institutions.164 
This fear influenced the Court to adopt a specialized approach165 
for adjudicating church property disputes that would avoid free 
exercise implications.166  
                                                                                                     
(“Although the principle that courts will not interfere in religious societies with 
reference to their ecclesiastical practice stems from the separation of the church 
and state, this view has always been qualified by the rule that civil and property 
rights would be adjudicated.”). 
 160. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 319−20 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 
679, 728 (1871)). 
 161. See Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 
1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that deprivation of protections of civil law 
“would raise its own serious problems under the Free Exercise Clause”). 
 162. Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 87 
(S.C. 2017). 
 163. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871) (“It is of the essence of these 
religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of 
questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all 
cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism 
itself provides for.”). 
 164. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 124−25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (listing 
instances of interference with religion, such as Mussolini’s attack on the Church 
of Rome, the Russian Church’s tsarist governance, and Bismark’s laws targeting 
German Catholics). 
 165. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969) (“[L]ogic . . . leaves the civil courts 
no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property 
disputes.” (emphasis in original)). 
 166. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (noting that church autonomy is granted 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause); Watson, 80 U.S. at 728 (“[T]he full 
and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle 
and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality 
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When the property rights in dispute follow from ecclesiastical 
incidents, such as decisions of church custom or law, court 
involvement is precluded.167 Justice Frankfurter noted that “a very 
real danger to religious freedom [is] posed by even ostensibly 
innocent government intrusions into essentially religious 
matters.”168 Ecclesiastical169 disputes are thus quarantined from 
all court involvement.170  
Many church property disputes result from a doctrinal schism 
within a local congregation, causing a faction of the local church to 
withdraw from the national organization.171 These cases commonly 
see “the belief on the part of those supporting disaffiliation that 
they are the ones following the ‘true’ faith while the ecclesiastical 
organizations above them are not.”172 If there are underlying 
                                                                                                     
and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all.”). 
 167. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 324 (noting that constitutional concerns 
mandate church control in ecclesiastical disputes). 
 168. See id. at 325 (summarizing Justice Frankfurter’s concern over court 
involvement in church issues); see also Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 121 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (noting the power to exercise religious authority was the “essence of 
this controversy”). 
 169. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 (1976) 
(defining ecclesiastical as concerning “church discipline, ecclesiastical 
government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of 
morals required of them”); Rosicrucian Fellowship, 245 P.2d at 487−88  
The courts of the land are not concerned with mere polemic discussions, 
and cannot . . . determine the abstract truth of religious doctrines, or 
adjudicate whether a certain person is a Catholic in good standing, or 
settle mere questions of faith or doctrine, . . . or decide who the rightful 
leader of a church ought to be . . . .  
(citing CARL ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW § 313 (1933)). 
 170. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 87 (“If the dispute is ‘a 
question of religious law or doctrine masquerading as a dispute over church 
property or corporate control,’ then the Constitution of the United States requires 
the civil court defer to the decision of the appropriate ecclesiastical authority.”). 
 171. See id. at 85 (“A congregational church is an independent organization, 
governed solely within itself . . . , while a hierarchical (or ecclesiastical) church 
may be defined as one organized as a body with other churches having similar 
faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head.”); 1 
GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §  2.10 (2018) (noting that trademark adjudication is 
complicated by church “schisms and requests to determine the ‘true’ religious 
order”). 
 172. See Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. Cal. Presbytery, 2003 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8523, at *73−74 (Sept. 10, 2003) (noting that the lower 
court violated “the rule prohibiting courts from interference in disputes over 
religious doctrine” when it inquired into the beliefs of the church members). 
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doctrinal issues at play in the property dispute, the court must 
refrain from addressing them.173  
Courts agree that involvement in an ecclesiastical issue is a 
clear violation of the First Amendment.174 This holds true in the 
specific context of intra-church trademark adjudication. 175 Courts 
that take “sides in a religious schism, purport to decide matters of 
spiritual succession, and exclude dissenters from using the name, 
symbols, and marks of the faith” violate the First Amendment.176 
Legal access to a religious organization’s name or symbol enables 
the entity to retain control over its identity.177 
Some lower courts have adjudicated intra-church trademark 
disputes with less disagreement than intra-church real property 
disputes,178 declaring that they do not require involvement in 
ecclesiastical matters.179 However, other lower courts are in 
tension regarding the impact of trademark adjudication on free 
exercise rights.180 The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian 
Church, 245 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. 1952) (“The essential problem, nevertheless, is to 
ascertain from the acts, dealings and usages of the parties where the various 
rights rest in order to determine the ownership of civil and property rights, even 
though some so-called ecclesiastical rights are involved.”). 
 174. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (“[T]he First Amendment 
prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of 
religious doctrine and practice.”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 732 (1871) (noting 
the finality of ecclesiastical decisions made by church tribunals). 
 175. See infra Part IV.B.2 (outlining Free Exercise implications resulting 
from intra-church trademark adjudication). 
 176. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S. Under the Hereditary 
Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S., Inc., 628 
F.3d 837, 846 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 177. See Simon, supra note 135, at 239−40 (“Control of the 
organizational trademark is crucial to religious capital because the value of the 
mark consists of its identity.”). 
 178. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 92 
(S.C. 2017) (finding the court sharply divided over the real property dispute, but 
largely in agreement on the validity of the mother church’s federal trademark 
rights). 
 179. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 987 (4th Cir. 1944) (“No question 
of religious liberty is involved.”); Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. 
McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 408 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Trademark law will not turn on 
whether the plaintiffs’ members or McGill and his congregants are the true 
believers.”). 
 180. Compare McGill, 617 F.3d at 408  
The district court held that it had no jurisdiction to resolve a 
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impact of court involvement in such disputes on the First 
Amendment.181 Existing scholarship on the constitutional 
implications of intra-church trademark disputes affirms that the 
issue is far from settled.182 
Due to the nature of intra-church trademark disputes,183 court 
adjudication inherently infringes on a church’s free exercise rights 
under the First Amendment.184 Neutral principles of law must be 
used to adjudicate church trademark disputes, like any other 
church property dispute.185 Church trademarks are ecclesiastical 
in nature186 and, thus, precluded from court adjudication.187 If 
                                                                                                     
trademark-infringement claim brought by one sect against the other, 
as that would require it to decide the doctrinal issue of proper 
succession. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “the district court 
can apply the regular factors that courts employ to determine 
infringement” and that “[t]he defendants can raise neutral defenses, 
such as prior use of the marks.” 
with Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244, 
1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (declaring that courts can decide church intellectual property 
issues without violating the First Amendment); Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the 
First Church of Christ v. Evans, 520 A.2d 1347, 1357 (N.J. 1987) (“As to the 
question of whether an injunction would violate defendants’ rights to exercise 
their religion freely . . . we go no further than to record our grave reservations.”). 
 181. Presbytery of the Twin Cities Area v. Eden Prairie Presbyterian Church, 
Inc., 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 375, review denied, 2017 Minn. LEXIS 444 
(July 18, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2619 (June 11, 2018); Protestant Episcopal 
Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, cert. denied, No. 17-1136, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (U.S. June 11, 
2018).  
 182. See Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 505 (debating Free 
Exercise implications of church trademark adjudications); Simon, supra note 135, 
at 239 (noting that a church’s trademark may encompass its identity); Russell, 
supra note 136, at 711 (stating that trade names may be a “religious touchstone 
for another individual”). 
 183. This Note focuses on trademark disputes between churches, resulting 
from local churches leaving the national church or splitting from a local church. 
Most disputes of this nature involve hierarchical church structure. See supra note 
171 and accompanying text (defining hierarchical). 
 184. See infra Part IV.B.2 and accompanying text (asserting that church 
trademarks are ecclesiastical in nature and should be freed from court 
involvement). This Note only examines free exercise rights in intra-church 
trademark adjudication. Church suits involving third party trademark 
infringement are not at issue in this analysis.  
 185.  See supra notes 47−61 and accompanying text (summarizing the neutral 
principles approach). 
 186. See infra notes 221−223 (discussing the ecclesiastical character of church 
names). 
 187. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (using neutral principles of 
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courts decide trademark disputes between churches, they involve 
themselves in ecclesiastical matters that are barred from court 
consideration, which violates the Free Exercise Clause.188 
1. Neutral Principles of Law 
The Supreme Court has long stated that real property 
disputes between churches are to be decided on neutral principles 
of law.189 Lower courts generally apply neutral principles of law to 
settle real church property disputes,190 but are not consistent in 
applying neutral principles to intra-church intellectual property 
disputes.191 While “[t]he State has an obvious and legitimate 
interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in 
providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can 
be determined conclusively,”192 courts do not uniformly adjudicate 
claims to reach this goal.193   
                                                                                                     
law to free courts from doctrinal entanglement); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 
729 (1872) (stating church hierarchical bodies must decide ecclesiastical matters). 
 188. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602 (adjudicating church property disputes cannot 
involve “consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of 
worship or the tenets of faith” (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God 
v. Church of God, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring))). 
 189. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 730 (noting that the Court has no “ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction”). 
 190. See First Indep. Missionary Baptist Church v. McMillan, 153 So. 2d 337, 
339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that the church abandoned its real 
property); Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 
90−91 (S.C. 2017) (deciding in favor of the national church after a neutral 
principles analysis). 
 191. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 
408 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying neutral principles of law to church trademark 
adjudication); Sovereign Order of Saint John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1244 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (remanding for application consistent with neutral principles); 
Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 92 (neglecting to go through a neutral 
principles analysis in deciding the trademark dispute); Okla. Dist. Council of the 
Assemblies of God of Okla. v. New Hope Assembly of God Church of Norman, 597 
P.2d 1211, 1213 (Okla. 1979) (applying neutral principles after determining the 
dispute did not rest upon doctrinal analysis); Lutheran Free Church v. Lutheran 
Free Church, 141 N.W.2d 827, 831 (Minn. 1966) (comparing doctrinal beliefs of 
church factions in lieu of neutral principles). 
 192. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602. 
 193. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (noting cases where the lower 
courts are inconsistent with their application of neutral principles in trademark 
disputes). 
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Although Congress codified modern trademark law in 1946,194 
intellectual property common law has an older origin.195 It is not 
surprising then that court adjudication of religious marks precedes 
the Lanham Act,196 creating a disconnect between the intersection 
of trademark law and the neutral principles of law approach.197 
Many times, when courts incorporate neutral principles of law 
into a trademark analysis they simultaneously make doctrinal 
declarations.198 Courts abandoned the “departure from doctrine” 
approach applied to real church property disputes in favor of the 
neutral principles approach,199 but remnants of the former are still 
seen in church trademark analysis.200 In Lutheran Free Church v. 
                                                                                                     
 194. See Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (defining criteria for 
federal recognition of trademarks). 
 195. See Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1 c. 3 (Eng.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents (codifying the first 
intellectual property law); see also B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. 
Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015) (“Trademark law has a long history, going back at least to 
Roman times.” (citing Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9, cmt. b 
(1993)).   
 196. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 991 (4th Cir. 1944) (adjudicating 
a church trademark dispute prior to enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946); 
Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (same). 
 197.  Compare McGill, 617 F.3d at 408 (“As this case involves the 
enforceability of intellectual-property rights, it makes sense to consider the 
Supreme Court’s precedents in the area of church property disputes.”), with 
Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 90−92 (applying neutral principles of 
law to the real property dispute, while applying federal trademark law to church 
service marks and trade names foregoing a complete neutral principles analysis). 
 198. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court of Illinois substituted its interpretation of the Diocesan 
and Mother Church constitutions for that of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals 
in which church law vests authority to make that interpretation.”); McGill, 617 
F.3d at 408 (noting the doctrinal similarities between the plaintiff and defendant 
pastor, leader of the breakaway church); Lutheran Free Church, 141 N.W.2d at 
831 (stating that there were no doctrinal differences between the Lutheran Free 
Church and the American Lutheran Church). 
 199. See Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Right of Charitable or Religious 
Association or Corporation to Protection Against Use of Same or Similar Name by 
Another, 37 A.L.R.3d 277 (2018) (defining “departure from doctrine” as granting 
title to the “[church faction] remaining faithful to the doctrine upon which the 
society was organized”).  
 200. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1872) (departing from the English 
courts’ approach of deciding “the true standard of faith in the church”); see also 
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451−52 (1969) (“[A] civil court may no more review a church 
decision applying a state departure-from-doctrine standard than it may apply 
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Lutheran Free Church,201 the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
determined that the majority faction of the congregation did not 
deviate from the doctrinal beliefs of the original church and was 
thus entitled to use the name “Lutheran Free Church.”202 There, 
the Minnesota court engaged in an ecclesiastical determination at 
odds with neutral principles and the Free Exercise Clause.203 This 
sort of analysis defeats the purpose of using the neutral principles 
approach, which seeks to free the court from any involvement in 
church doctrine.204  
Neutral principles of law are violated any time a court 
analyzes the doctrinal beliefs of a religious organization.205 Courts 
recognize that obvious declarations proclaiming who the “true 
church is” crosses the line in real property disputes,206 yet approve 
of an analytical framework which compares the religious beliefs 
between two religious organizations when deciding intellectual 
                                                                                                     
that standard itself.”). 
 201.  141 N.W.2d 827 (Minn. 1966). 
 202.  See id. at 835–36 (declaring the majority faction the rightful owner of 
the tradename “Lutheran Free Church”). 
 203. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 730 (noting that the Court has no “ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction”). 
 204. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (“The primary advantages of 
the neutral principles approach are that it is completely secular in operation.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 205. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 
449  
First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property 
litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of 
controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts 
undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the 
property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free 
development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests 
in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. 
 206. See Nat’l Bd. of YWCA v. YWCA, 335 F. Supp. 615, 624 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(“[A]ny determination by a Court of Law as to whether plaintiff has deviated from 
a ‘Christian’ purpose . . . is prohibited by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.”); Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S. Under 
the Hereditary Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of 
the U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d 837, 842−43, 846 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing the lower 
court’s declaration that “[t]here is only one Baha’i Faith,” and that the National 
Spiritual Assembly is the “highest authority for the Faith in [the] continental 
United States and is entitled to exclusive use of the marks and symbols of the 
Faith”). 
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property matters.207 The Supreme Court stated that any 
involvement in doctrinal or ideological discussion is 
prohibitedthere is no exception for any type of doctrinal analysis, 
even if the court is not making decisions regarding who is the “true 
church.”208 
Courts should commit to applying neutral principles of law to 
all church property disputes, real and intellectual property 
alike.209 If a court decides that real property disputes cannot be 
decided on the basis that the dispute is really a “question of 
religious law or doctrine masquerading as a dispute over church 
property [and] corporate control”210 and is ecclesiastical, then it 
follows that any simultaneous dispute over trademarks should 
undertake the same analysis.211 The Supreme Court recognized 
that churches are unique in their purpose and set out the neutral 
principles approach to accommodate for their differences.212  
                                                                                                     
 207. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 
408 (6th Cir. 2010) (comparing the religious beliefs of churches and stating that 
the beliefs are identical); Lutheran Free Church v. Lutheran Free Church, 141 
N.W.2d 827, 831 (Minn. 1966) (same); see also Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 445−46 (rejecting the “departure from doctrine” 
inquiry used by English courts that require courts to analyze whether church 
doctrine is consistent with expected organization beliefs). 
 208. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 
451−52 (“The First Amendment prohibits a State from employing religious 
organizations as an arm of the civil judiciary to perform the function of 
interpreting and applying state standards.”); see also Wolf, 443 U.S. at 607−09 
(finding that the inquiry boiled down to which faction represented the “true” 
church). 
 209. See infra note 216 and accompanying text (describing the neutral 
principles framework as the best insurance against Free Exercise violations). 
 210.  Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 86 
(S.C. 2017) (quoting All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 
685 S.E.2d 163, 172 (S.C. 2009)). 
 211.  See id. at 84−85, 92−93 (concluding that “the present property and 
church governance disputes are not appropriate for resolution in the civil courts,” 
yet deciding the trademark dispute based on federal trademark law). The 
trademark dispute was decided in favor of the National church in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of South Carolina. See vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, No. 
2:13-587-RMG (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 2019) (granting summary judgment for the 
National Episcopal church and enjoining the dissociated parishes from using the 
trademarked names). 
 212. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 985 (4th Cir. 1944) (noting that 
churches “exist for the worship of Almighty God and for the purpose of benefiting 
mankind and not for purposes of profit”). 
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Applying neutral principles of law to intellectual property 
disputes does not mean that courts must ignore federal trademark 
law.213 Neutral principles would direct courts to first consider 
whether the issue they are adjudicating, church trademarks, is 
ecclesiastical.214 If the issue is ecclesiastical then the court would 
be precluded from applying federal trademark law to the 
dispute.215  
Courts should treat all property disputes with the same 
analytical approach provided by neutral principles of law.216 In an 
area complicated by complex constitutional law issues, lower 
courts need to apply neutral principles consistently.217 The 
Supreme Court provided a consistent framework for intra-church 
real property disputes, which can similarly be applied to church 
trademark disputes.218 
                                                                                                     
 213. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 725 (1872) (“[W]here there is a schism 
which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such 
bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles 
which govern voluntary associations.”). 
 214. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 87 (determining that first 
courts must determine whether the adjudication requires involvement in issues 
of religion). 
 215. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (“If in such a case the 
interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to 
resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the 
doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.”). 
 216. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709−10 
(1976) (noting that where “resolution of the disputes cannot be made without 
extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity” neutral principles 
is superseded by deference to the church tribunal); Protestant Episcopal Church, 
806 S.E.2d at 87, 91−92 (describing the first step of neutral principles). 
 217. Compare Tubeville v. Morris, 26 S.E.2d 821, 826−29 (S.C. 1943) 
(attempting to apply neutral principals to the trademark dispute over use of the 
church name), with Purcell, 145 F.2d at 987−88 (wading into ecclesiastical 
matters by applying trademark law without reference to neutral principles); see 
also Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 525 (remarking that Morris 
and Purcell adjudicated the same dispute yet produced drastically different 
results). 
 218. See supra notes 47, 166 (outlining the framework for church property 
disputes). 
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2. Church Trademarks are Ecclesiastical in Nature 
Once courts implement the neutral principles of law analysis 
for intra-church trademark disputes, the first step will preclude 
further adjudication.219 In intra-church property disputes, the first 
step decides which path the court should take.220 Because of the 
inherently ecclesiastical nature of church trademarks,221 when 
asked whether the adjudication requires involvement in “issues of 
religious law,” 222 the courts will be forced to answer yes.223 The 
presence of ecclesiastical “issues of religious law” bars the court 
from engaging in a neutral principles analysis and mandates 
deference to the highest church authority.224 In other words, a 
dispute over the use of a church trademark225 is ecclesiastical and 
courts are precluded from involvement.226  
Trademarks, specifically tradenames,227 are representative of 
an entity’s identity.228 Churches seek out tradename protection to 
                                                                                                     
 219.  See Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 
1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that deference is mandatory when the dispute 
would have the court “intrude impermissibly into religious doctrinal issues”). 
 220. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (noting that while neutral 
principles of law is available for use by courts, the approach is not appropriate 
where doctrinal issues are involved). 
 221. See Simon, supra note 135, at 239 (noting that trade names encompass 
the entities’ identity); infra notes 226, 228 (arguing the ecclesiastical nature of 
church names). 
 222. Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 87 
(S.C. 2017). 
 223. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 320 (“[A] sound view rooted in our 
perception of church and state relations would require courts to accept, as final 
and binding, those decisions pertaining to religious matters made by the church's 
highest authority.”). 
 224. See Masterson v. Diocese of N.W. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 602 (Tex. 2013) 
(noting deference is “compulsory because courts lack jurisdiction to decide 
ecclesiastical questions”). 
 225. See Simon, supra note 135, at 237 (describing collective trademarks that 
represent that the “source of the goods or services is a member of a larger group”). 
 226.  See id. at 240 (arguing that church trademarks are a legally cognizable 
form of the church’s identity). 
 227. See Church of God v. Church of God, 50 A.2d 357, 362 (Penn. 1947) 
(granting exclusive rights to the phrase “Church of God” to one faction over 
another).  
 228. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir. 1944) (concluding 
that the name of a church has great value “because millions of members 
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safeguard identity,229 but are unique in that the tradename 
represents a specific religious identity.230 Several courts recognize 
this function of trademarks in the religious context.231 Even if the 
dispute revolved around the use of a church name such as “Main 
Street Church,” and lacked any reference to a specific religious 
denomination, the name would still represent a congregation’s 
identity. Any conflict regarding the use of “Main Street Church” 
would be ecclesiastical and barred from court involvement under 
neutral principles analysis. 
A church’s name represents to the world what its congregants 
practice and believe.232 Through intra-church trademark 
adjudication the court effectively tells the church banned from 
using the trademark at issue that they are not entitled to the 
identity attached to the respective mark.233 
A prime example is the case of General Conference Corp. v. 
McGill.234 In this Sixth Circuit case, Reverend McGill left the 
                                                                                                     
associated with the name the most sacred of their personal relationships and the 
holiest of their family traditions”). 
 229. See Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 486−87 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (noting 
the common law rule that an entity is entitled to protection to its name under 
which business has been conducted); Tarr, supra note 87 (“[T]rademark law 
allows churches to forge identities representing coherent spiritual messages, with 
which their members can align.”). 
 230. See Simon, supra note 135, at 240 (“Thus, the whole identity of the 
religious groupits ideology, its teachings and its practicesis contained in an 
identity-indicating name or symbol.”); Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and 
Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 388 (2011) (noting that traditional trademark 
doctrine sees trademarks as source identifiers). 
 231. See Church of God v. Church of God of Prophecy, Opposition No. 94,180, 
2000 TTAB LEXIS 338, at *9−12 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (noting that the trademark in 
question may represent the identity and ideology of the church, but it is not a 
proper inquiry for the administrative board); Simon, supra note 135, at 278−79 
(noting that the court “implicated identity” in its trademark infringement 
analysis) (discussing Church of God, 50 A.2d at 357−62)); Purcell, 145 F.2d at 982 
(noting the church’s name had value because it represented the church’s identity 
to the public). 
 232. See Simon, supra note 135, at 240 (“The collective mark represents the 
embodiment of the organization’s collective identity as owned by a 
groupsomething identified with and by all members of a religion.”). 
 233. See Russell, supra note 136, at 711 (“Because the trade name may be a 
‘religious touchstone for another individual,’ this acknowledgement of property 
protection may impede the ability of individuals to freely exercise religion without 
government interference.”). 
 234. 617 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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General Conference Corporation of Seventh-day Adventists over a 
doctrinal dispute, and began his own church, which he called “A 
Creation Seventh Day & Adventist Church.”235 The General 
Conference Corporation had multiple trademarks, including 
“Seventh-day Adventists,” and sought to enjoin McGill from 
describing his church with the term.236 In deciding the case, the 
court noted that, “[b]oth the plaintiffs and McGill believe that the 
second coming of Christ is imminent and that the Sabbath should 
be celebrated on Saturday.”237 The court concluded that the 
General Conference Corporation’s trademark of “Seventh-day 
Adventists” was valid, barring McGill from use of the term in 
naming his church.238 McGill and his congregation were, thus, 
stripped from use of the term that accurately described their 
identity to the outside world.239  
In its discussion, the court not only analyzed the religious 
beliefs of the two churches,240 a purely doctrinal issue, but it also 
reviewed the ecclesiastical issue of deciding which church was able 
to continue use of the identity-defining trademark.241 As Justice 
Frankfurter noted, “[U]nder [the] Constitution it is not open to the 
governments of this Union to reinforce the loyalty of their citizens 
by deciding who is the true exponent of their religion.”242 The 
government, including the courts, has no place in religious 
                                                                                                     
 235. See id. at 405 (noting that the corporation holds title to all of the church’s 
assets, indicating a hierarchical structure). 
 236. See id. (describing the various trademarks owned by the church that 
McGill allegedly infringed on). 
 237. Id. at 408. 
 238. See id. at 416 (affirming the lower court’s ruling that McGill’s use of the 
mark would cause confusion to the general public). 
 239. See id. at 405 (noting that McGill formed the church out of a “divine 
revelation”). 
 240. See id. at 408 (comparing the beliefs of the two congregations). 
 241. See id. at 416−17 (granting continued use of trademarks to the General 
Conference Corp.). In contrast to the Sixth Circuit, the district court in McGill 
took the neutral principles approach. See id. at 408 (“The district court held that 
it had no jurisdiction to resolve a trademark-infringement claim brought by one 
sect against the other, as that would require it to decide the doctrinal issue of 
proper succession.”). 
 242. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 
94, 125 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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matters.243 A neutral principles of law approach would preclude 
the court from making similar decisions.244  
McGill is not an oddity in intra-church trademark 
jurisprudence.245 Churches will continue to face the threat of loss 
of identifying marks and names because of the hierarchical 
organization in which the churches are formed.246 “Nearly 
all . . . varieties of churches of the same denomination are the 
results of secession or withdrawals from the parent church of that 
name, and it has been the usual course for the new church to adopt 
as a permanent part of its name the name of the parent 
organization.”247 Churches are vulnerable to infringement action 
when they continue using their “parent’s” name in their new 
identifying marks.248 
Churches are not like corporations, whose application of 
federal trademark law is fairly straightforward.249 When 
                                                                                                     
 243. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 244. See supra notes 214−215 and accompanying text (describing the neutral 
principles of law approach); see also Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church 
of Christ, Scientist v. Robinson, 115 F. Supp. 2d 607, 610 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (“If a 
parent religious society remains true to the tenets of the religion, it is entitled to 
protection against a minority’s use of the same name.” (citing 1 MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS §  9:7 (4th Ed. 2000))). 
 245. See Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (seeing 
the seceding minority group barred from use of the church’s name); Lutheran Free 
Church v. Lutheran Free Church, 141 N.W.2d 827, 831−33 (Minn. 1966) (seeing 
a minority congregation of a church lose its right to use the name it held for sixty 
years due to the majority’s merger with another congregation under a new name); 
Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 84−85, 92 (2017) 
(barring the local church’s use of the national church’s identifying name, which it 
used for over 200 years). 
 246. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 85 (“[A] hierarchical [or 
ecclesiastical] church may be defined as one organized as a body with other 
churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or 
ecclesiastical head.”); Fennelly, supra note 39, at 321 (explaining that because 
hierarchical churches have both vertical and horizontal aspects, the church is 
defined as “the body of believers, united associationally as well as juridically 
beyond the congregation”). 
 247. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Evans, 105 
N.J. 297, 312 (1987) (citation omitted). 
 248. See id. at 301−04 (finding a breakaway church sued by its “parent” 
church over use of identifying marks). 
 249. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 984 (4th Cir. 1944) (“[T]o use the 
name of a corporation . . . in such way as to attempt to appropriate the good will 
transferred and deprive the transferee of what it has thus acquired, is a wrong 
which should be enjoined . . . .”). 
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corporations seek to infringe on another’s trademark it is for the 
competitive advantage that mark provides.250 However, when 
churches infringe on another’s trademark it is because of the 
religious organization’s long history of association with that 
trademark, which represents the congregation’s beliefs.251 The 
inherently religious nature of church names deserves special 
concern in trademark adjudication.252 
Churches are unique in their purpose and should be treated 
uniformly regarding all property disputes.253 Requiring application 
of the neutral principles of law approach to church trademark 
disputes, along with a finding that church tradenames are 
ecclesiastical, would prevent courts from further entanglement in 
doctrinal disputes.254 Uniform application of neutral principles to 
real and intellectual property disputes provides churches with a 
consistent framework to plan for the future and prevent 
disputes.255 
A return to Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church 
illustrates the dangers of inconsistent application of neutral 
                                                                                                     
 250. See id. (describing trademark infringement as “unfair competition”). 
 251. See Patricia Sullivan, ‘The church is not the building. It is our faith and 
our people.’, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/the-church-is-not-the-
building-it-is-our-faith-and-our-people/2015/12/26/dce43392-a41f-11e5-9c4e-
be37f66848bb_story.html?utm_term=.f946e14c2436 (last visited June 8, 2019) 
(“[W]e know in our heart of hearts the church is not the building. It is our faith 
and our people.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); but see Purcell, 
145 F.2d at 987  
The right to use the name inheres in the institution, not in its 
members; and, when they cease to be members of the institution, use 
by them of the name is misleading and, if injurious to the institution, 
should be enjoined. No question of religious liberty is involved. 
 252. See supra notes 221, 227−233 and accompanying text (discussing the 
ecclesiastical identity imbedded in a church’s trademark). 
 253. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (applying neutral principles 
of law). 
 254.  See supra note 245 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases 
that could have benefitted from a neutral principles approach to trademark 
adjudication). 
 255. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603−04 (explaining that churches can write 
procedures for resolving potential disputes into their trusts and books of order 
because the court will examine those documents when applying the neutral 
principles approach). 
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principles.256 Recall the dispute began when the national Episcopal 
Church made polity changes, which the South Carolina local 
church’s bishop disagreed with.257 The Episcopal Church is 
hierarchical, meaning that the national Episcopal Church has title 
to the property on which the local church in South Carolina is 
located.258 Hierarchical church structure mandates that courts 
defer to decisions of the highest ecclesiastical involvement when 
doctrinal issues are at play.259 
When the local church sought to leave the Episcopal Church, 
it began “providing Parishes with quitclaim deeds purporting to 
disclaim any interest of the Diocese” so that it could maintain 
control of the church’s real property.260 The local church also 
amended its bylaws to renounce any affiliation with the national 
church.261 The national churchthe highest ecclesiastical 
bodyaccepted the local church’s renunciation of its affiliation 
with the larger diocese, yet retained control of the congregation 
through the appointment of a new bishop.262 The South Carolina 
Supreme Court held that because of the church’s hierarchical 
structure, the court was bound by decisions of the church’s “highest 
ecclesiastical body.”263 Because the national church accepted the 
renunciation and ordained a new bishop, the civil court had no 
place stepping into an ecclesiastical dispute.264 With the national 
                                                                                                     
 256. See 806 S.E.2d 82, 88−92 (analyzing the real property and intellectual 
property disputes with differing breadths). 
 257. See id. at 90 n.8 (noting that the bishop and his congregation were 
uncomfortable with the mother church’s selection of the first openly homosexual 
bishop). 
 258. See id. at 85−86 (finding that the Episcopal Church is hierarchical). 
 259. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1872) (stating that when 
questions of polity are involved, courts must defer to the church’s highest 
ecclesiastical authority). 
 260. Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 91. 
 261. See id. (“[V]arious parishes in the Diocese undertook to sever the 
relationship between themselves and TEC through corporate amendments.”). 
 262. See id. (executing the separation of the two factions). 
 263. See id. (giving deference to the church’s ruling body (citing Pearson v. 
Church of God, 478 S.E.2d 849, 852 (S.C. 1996))). 
 264. See id. (“The finding that TEC is hierarchal requires that I defer to its 
highest ecclesiastical body.”). 
TEC has recognized the Associated Diocese to be the true Lower 
Diocese of South Carolina with Bishop vonRosenburg as its head, a 
civil court cannot inject itself into this church governance dispute and 
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church’s ruling, the church’s real property vested in the new 
bishop’s faction, who remained loyal to the national church.265  
The same dispute also involved claims of trademark 
infringement over the local church’s right to state-granted service 
marks, which indicated affiliation with the Episcopal Church.266 
While the court spent nineteen pages analyzing the real property 
dispute, it decided the service mark conflict in a single 
paragraph.267 Instead of analyzing the trademark claim with the 
neutral principles approach, the court immediately looked to state 
trademark law to determine that the state service marks must be 
cancelled in favor of the national church’s federal marks.268  
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari of the case, laying 
the real property issue to rest, while the trademark dispute faced 
further adjudication in the U.S. District Court of South 
Carolina.269 Bishop Lawrence’s local church faction lost the legal 
right to their church’s real property in the state case, and were 
then dealt a loss of rights to service marks that identified them as 
the church they had been for more than 150 years.270 While a 
straightforward application of trademark laws may dictate one 
church faction’s rights to the use of marks over another,271 history 
                                                                                                     
reevaluate that decision applying state law principles because this is a 
question of church polity, administration, and governance, matters 
into which civil courts may not intrude. 
Id. 
 265. See id. at 92−93 (recognizing the Episcopal Church’s authority over the 
matter, which, in effect, granted property to the loyal church faction).  
 266. See id. at 92 (noting respondents’ use of the term “Episcopal,” and the 
national church’s federally−registered trademarks, which include “The Episcopal 
Church” and “The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America”). 
 267. See id. (applying trademark law to determine that “in light 
of . . . confusion” caused by the state marks, they must be cancelled). 
 268. See id. (“[S]tate law dictates that the [national church’s] right to these 
marks is superior.” (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1145 (2016))). 
 269. See vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, No. 2:13-587-RMG (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 
2019) (enjoining the breakaway churches from continued use of service marks). 
 270. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 85 (noting the national 
church was formed when the S.C. Diocese formed with six others); see also Knapp, 
supra note 23 (discussing the emotional heartbreak experienced by congregants 
after the national church’s S.C. court victory). 
 271. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (detailing steps necessary for an 
infringement action); see also Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1921) (applying common trademark law to determine that the majority was 
entitled to exclusive use of the mark). 
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proves that religious controversies are anything but 
straightforward.272 
V. Should the Court Maintain Its Current Role? 
In his concurrence to Kedroff,273 Justice Frankfurter 
recognized the ability of church property, specifically a church’s 
cathedral, to represent more than just a piece of land, stating that 
the cathedral served as an “outward symbol of a religious faith.”274 
The purpose of a trademark is, similarly, meant to be a source 
identifier.275 Just like the cathedral in Kedroff represented the 
religious faith of the congregation,276 a church’s name, serves the 
same purpose.277 If the neutral principles approach is used to deal 
with the first property at issue,278 why is it not used to deal with 
the second?279 
Current court adjudication of intra-church trademark 
disputes violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
                                                                                                     
 272. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 
U.S. 94, 102−03 (1952) (detailing church’s history of political upheaval due to the 
Bolshevik Revolution and political unrest in Russia); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 
679, 734 (1979) (acknowledging the schism over the issue of slavery that “divided 
the Presbyterian churches through-out Kentucky and Missouri”). 
 273. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 274. See id. at 121 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“St. Nicholas Cathedral is 
not just a piece of real estate. . . . A cathedral is the seat and center of 
ecclesiastical authority. . . . What is at stake here is the power to exercise religious 
authority. That is the essence of this controversy.”). 
 275. See Okla. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of Okla. v. New Hope 
Assembly of God Church of Norman, 597 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Okla. 1979) (noting in 
trademarks that carry a secondary meaning “the word or name has come to stand 
in the minds of the public as a name or identification for that product or firm”). 
 276. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 121 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
religious authority becomes manifest and is exerted through authority over the 
Cathedral as the outward symbol of a religious faith.”). 
 277. See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 982−83 (4th Cir. 1944) (“The name 
of this church . . . was of great value, not only because business was carried on 
and property held in that name, but also because millions of members associated 
with the name the most sacred of their personal relationships and the holiest of 
their family traditions.”). 
 278. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120−21 (noting that where a property right flows 
from an ecclesiastical issue, courts must yield to church rule). 
 279. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 92 (finding the court 
applying trademark law without discussion of neutral principles).  
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Amendment.280 The Supreme Court consistently recognized that 
First Amendment dangers accompany court resolution of church 
disputes, which led to the adoption of the neutral principles 
approach.281 The framework is adaptable to any church dispute 
over property rights.282  
Trademarks are a form of property rights.283 At their core, 
trademarks carry the right to exclude others from the use of the 
registered mark, name, or symbol.284 Trademarks have evolved to 
the point that the rights “are beginning to resemble a type of 
‘property right in gross.’”285 In sum, trademarks have inherent 
valuethe right to exclusive use286akin to the value recognized 
in real property.287 Trademarks, as property rights, are entitled to 
                                                                                                     
 280. See supra notes 186−188, 204−208 (analyzing the Free Exercise 
implications that occur when courts adjudicate ecclesiastical trademark rights). 
 281. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 729−32 (recognizing the danger in courts 
unfamiliar with ecclesiastical law adjudicating a church dispute). 
 282. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (stating that the neutral principles 
approach was developed “for use in all property disputes”). 
 283. See Nat’l Bd. of the YWCA v. YWCA, 335 F. Supp. 615, 624−25 (D.S.C. 
1971) (declaring that “a trademark is a property right”); Adam Mossoff, 
Trademark As A Property Right, 107 KY. L.J. 1, 7 (2018) (characterizing 
trademarks as a property “use-right,” and detailing other “use-rights” such as 
easements); Richard Epstein, Two Ways of Viewing IP, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2005), 
https://www.ft.com/content/c3e23a90-a5ea-11d9-b67b-00000e2511c8 (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2019) (stating that the “sound rules of property law” apply to intellectual 
property) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); but see Peter S. 
Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, REGULATION, 
Fall 2007, at 36−38 (questioning whether the traditional notions of tangible 
property should apply to intellectual property), 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/10/v30n3-
6.pdf.  
 284. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (requiring trademark applicants to ensure 
the exclusive use of the mark). 
 285. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A 
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 n.53 (2004) (noting that courts frequently 
refer to trademarks as property rights themselves, rather than in the goodwill 
they protect). 
 286. See Mossoff, supra note 283, at 4 (“Trademark law secures the exclusive 
use and enjoyment of a mark as representative of the exclusive use and enjoyment 
of the underlying property.”). 
 287. See Mossoff, supra note 283, at 14 (noting that property is not just the 
tangible aspect, but “the right to freely possess, use, and alienate the same” 
(emphasis added)). 
LEFT WITH NO NAME 1387 
the same deferential approach set out by the Supreme Court 
through neutral principles.288 
Those who find current court adjudication of intra-church 
trademark disputes consistent with the Free Exercise Clause 
overlook the purpose behind neutral principles.289 Two such 
scholars noted that because trademark law is facially neutral the 
Free Exercise Clause is not implicated.290 The analysis, however, 
cannot end here. While a church may receive trademark protection 
without Free Exercise implications,291 issues arise once that mark 
is in dispute.292  
When a church is stripped of its trademark, it loses the right 
to use that mark.293 In the context of intra-church disputes, this 
property loss prevents the losing party from referring to itself in 
its preferred manner.294 A two-hundred-year-old congregation 
loses its identifying marks;295 a pastor is barred from referring to 
his church as his chosen denomination;296 a minority congregation 
                                                                                                     
 288. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 609 (1979) (requiring deference be given 
to the church’s ruling body in cases concerning the church’s identity). 
 289. See Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 521−22 (theorizing 
that the application of trademark law does not carry Free Exercise implications). 
 290. See id. (“[T]here has been no suggestion that the trade name and 
trademarks legislation was passed with the invidious design of inhibiting one 
group's free exercise.”). 
 291. See id. (noting the grant of trademark protection does not inhibit 
worship). 
 292. Silversmith and Guggenheim recognize the role played by neutral 
principles, stating that “[c]ourts must only apply neutral principles of law” to 
intra-church trademark disputes. Id. at 526. 
 293. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012) (granting injunctive relief for parties deemed 
the rightful owners of a trademark). 
 294. See First Indep. Missionary Baptist Church v. McMillan, 153 So. 2d 337, 
342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (inhibiting the minority faction from using a name 
abandoned by the majority); Hooper v. Stone, 202 P. 485, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1921) (declaring right to the church’s name in the majority faction); but see 
Pilgrim Holiness Church v. First Pilgrim Holiness Church, 252 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. 
Ct. App. 1969) (allowing the minority faction to keep its preferred name 
previously abandoned by the majority). 
 295.  See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 92 
(S.C. 2017) (canceling the local church’s state trademarks in favor of the national 
church’s federal marks). 
 296. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 
415−17 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding the infringement claim against a pastor’s use 
of the term “Seventh-day Adventist”). 
1388 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1345 (2019) 
can no longer use the name it has held for over sixty years.297 It is 
hard to deny that violations of the Free Exercise Clause have 
occurred in the previous examples.298 A church’s exercise of 
religion is burdened when it is prevented from publicly identifying 
with its preferred name or mark.299 This type of burden on free 
exercise is the very thing neutral principles of law was created to 
avoid.300  
While it would be simpler to immediately apply trademark law 
to such disputes,301 constitutional concerns mandate a preemptive 
neutral principles analysis.302 If courts apply neutral principles 
they are prevented from ever applying trademark law, as neutral 
principles tells courts to cease involvement once ecclesiastical 
issues are known.303 The free exercise concern lies not with the 
trademark law itself, but with the property at issue−the inherently 
ecclesiastical trademark.304 
                                                                                                     
 297. See Lutheran Free Church v. Lutheran Free Church, 141 N.W.2d 827, 
835−36 (Minn. 1966) (ruling against a minority faction who opposed the church’s 
merger and sought to retain possession of the old name). 
 298. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 
U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (stressing the importance of a church’s “power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine”). 
 299. See Fennelly, supra note 39, at 355−56 (noting that the Free Exercise 
Clause provides for church autonomy, including “the right to select their own 
leaders, define their own doctrines resolve their own disputes, and run their own 
institutions”). 
 300. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (recognizing the role neutral 
principles play in preventing courts from violating the Free Exercise Clause). 
 301.  See Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 525 (stating that 
courts are able to “simply resolve the trade-name issue on property grounds”). 
 302. See Protestant Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d at 87 (“The court must first 
determine whether the property/corporate dispute will require the court to decide 
issues . . . actually ecclesiastical in nature.”). 
 303. See id. (noting the court must cease involvement in the dispute once 
issues of polity or religion become apparent). 
 304. See All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 685 
S.E.2d 163, 172 (S.C. 2009) (cautioning courts to carefully analyze the property 
in dispute to determine whether it is a question of religious law rather than 
property law). 
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While neutral principles of law is not a perfect approach,305 it 
is the framework given by the Supreme Court.306 All property 
cases, real and intellectual alike, should be subject to the same 
deferential approach afforded by neutral principles of law.307 
Under current conditions, churches are left in purgatory over their 
rights to church trademarks.308 Religious institutions deserve a 
consistent framework that can be applied to a myriad of property 
disputes.309 A church schism is difficult enough without court 
intrusion.310 It was not by accident that the nation’s founders 
included provisions for religious freedom and protection in the 
First Amendment.311 And while the Court responsible for the 
neutral principles approach worried that it would “increase the 
involvement of civil courts in church controversies,”312 the majority 
of the Supreme Court recognized that the need for a framework for 
such disputes outweighed concerns over religious entanglement.313  
In a perfect world the Supreme Court would grant certiorari 
and clear up confusion surrounding intra-church trademark 
adjudication.314 For now, courts are left trying to fit a doctrine from 
                                                                                                     
 305. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 610 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority’s adoption of neutral principles that would “invite 
intrusion into church polity”). 
 306.  See id. at 602−03 (adopting the neutral principles approach). 
 307. See id. at 609 (noting that if the case required invasion of polity, “then 
the First Amendment requires that the . . . courts give deference to the 
presbyterial commission’s determination of that church’s identity”). 
 308. See supra note 211 (finding the state trademark claim continued in 
federal court); Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 118, at 525 (detailing 
conflicting opinions between the South Carolina Supreme Court and the Fourth 
Circuit over the same property dispute). 
 309. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 
449 (noting the neutral principles approach’s flexibility). 
 310. See Brief for 106 Religious Leaders as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents’ Petition For Rehearing at 17, Protestant Episcopal Church v. 
Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82 (S.C. 2017) (No. 15-000622) [hereinafter Brief 
for 106 Religious Leaders] (discussing the $500 million property at stake in the 
fractured congregation’s dispute). 
 311. See supra note 164 (detailing instances of government interference in 
religious matters). 
 312. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., dissenting) (declaring that the 
neutral principles approach “departs from long-established precedents”). 
 313. See id. at 605−06 (stating that the neutral principles approach does not 
‘“inhibit’ the free exercise of religion”). 
 314. See Brief for 106 Religious Leaders, supra note 310, at 17−18 (noting the 
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1979 to current intellectual property disputes mired in religious 
turmoil.315 
VI. Conclusion 
Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding church real 
property disputes is subject to special rules to account for the 
complexities surrounding court involvement in a religious 
dispute.316 The neutral principles approach, adopted by the 
Supreme Court decades ago, is applied inconsistently to 
intellectual property by lower federal and state courts.317  
If the neutral principles approach were consistently applied, it 
would preclude court involvement in intra-church intellectual 
property disputes, specifically trademark disputes.318 Church 
trademarks, such as a church’s name or symbol, are inherently 
ecclesiastical due to the association of the mark with the church’s 
identity and religious beliefs.319 Court inquiry into intra-church 
trademark disputes violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment because it essentially tells one church faction, “You 
are the church,” while telling the other, “You are not.”320 In effect, 
                                                                                                     
insecurity surrounding intra-church disputes that makes “many rounds of future 
litigation inevitable”). 
 315. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602−09 (adopting the modern neutral principles 
framework). 
 316. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 
449 (approving of the neutral principles approach to avoid the ever-present 
hazards of inhibiting free exercise of religion). 
 317. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 
408−10 (6th Cir. 2010) (failing to apply the neutral principles framework); Purcell 
v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 985−87 (4th Cir. 1944) (same); Protestant Episcopal 
Church v. Episcopal Church, 806 S.E.2d 82, 91−92 (S.C. 2017) (applying neutral 
principles to the real property dispute, but not to the trademark dispute). 
 318. See supra notes 253−255 and accompanying text (discussing how neutral 
principles would prevent courts from delving into an ecclesiastical trademark 
dispute). 
 319. See Simon, supra note 135, at 312 (stating that churches turn to 
trademark law “because there is no other mechanism to adequately protect their 
identities”). 
 320. See McGill, 617 F.3d at 408 (finding the defendant arguing that “the 
district court could not apply neutral principles of trademark law without 
resolving an underlying doctrinal dispute: to wit, who are the ‘true’ Seventh-day 
Adventists”). 
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the church faction precluded from trademark use is left with no 
name.321 
While the neutral principles approach is not perfect, it is the 
framework courts have at their current disposal. Until the 
Supreme Court clarifies the proper analysis for intra-church 
trademark disputes, courts should apply neutral principles on a 
consistent basis to all church property suits. 
                                                                                                     
 321. See id. at 415−16 (awarding summary judgment and leaving the 
defendant’s church without use of its former name). 
